Initiale Freigabe

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# torproject
# Torproject
Alles rund um das Torproject
Aktuell stelle ich nur ein Installationsscript für Ubuntu zu Verfügung.
Man kann Tor Relay selbstverständlich auch aus den Paketquellen von Ubuntu installieren, jedoch sind die Pakete oft nicht aktuell und deshalb sicherheitstechnisch schwierig.
## Voraussetzungen:
OS: `Ubuntu 22.04`
Architektur: `amd64`
## Installation
Die Installation kann einfach gestartet werden:
`curl -s https://git.media-techport.de/scriptos/torproject/raw/branch/main/tor-relay-installer-ubuntu2204.v1.sh | bash`
## Konfiguration
Die Konfiguration wird üblicherweise nach der Installation mit `nano /etc/tor/torrc` vorgenommen.
| Option | Beschreibung | Beispiel / Standardwert |
| ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------- |
| `SocksPort` | Gibt den Port an, auf dem Tor SOCKS-Anfragen entgegennimmt. | `9050` |
| `Log` | Legt fest, wo und in welchem Format Tor Protokolleinträge speichert.| `notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log` |
| `ExitPolicy` | Bestimmt, welche Art von Ausgangsverkehr vom Server erlaubt wird. | `reject *:*` |
| `HiddenServiceDir` | Verzeichnis, in dem Informationen zu versteckten Diensten gespeichert werden. | `/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/` |
| `HiddenServicePort` | Gibt die Portnummer an, die für einen versteckten Dienst verwendet wird. | `80 127.0.0.1:8080` |
| `ControlPort` | Port für die Tor-Steuerungsschnittstelle. | `9051` |
| `HashedControlPassword` | Passwort für die Authentifizierung an der Steuerungsschnittstelle. | `16:872860B760133C1D60E856594C8C704751AF76C584B510D` |
| `DataDirectory` | Speicherort für Tor-Laufzeitdaten. | `/var/lib/tor` |
| `GeoIPFile` | Pfad zur GeoIP-Datenbankdatei für die Standorterkennung. | `/usr/share/tor/geoip` |
| `HardwareAccel` | Aktiviert Hardware-Beschleunigung, falls verfügbar. | `1` |
| `ClientOnly` | Definiert, ob der Knoten nur als Client und nicht als Relay fungieren soll. | `1` |
| `RelayBandwidthRate` | Begrenzt die Bandbreite, die das Tor-Relay verwendet. | `100 KBytes` |
| `RelayBandwidthBurst` | Erlaubt kurzfristige Überschreitung der Bandbreitenbeschränkung. | `200 KBytes` |
| `ExcludeExitNodes` | Verhindert, dass bestimmte Knoten als Exit-Relays verwendet werden.| `{ru},{ua},{by}` |
| `NumEntryGuards` | Anzahl der Eintrittswächter, die Tor für Pfade verwendet. | `3` |
| `CircuitBuildTimeout` | Zeitlimit für den Aufbau eines Tor-Circuits. | `60` |
| `KeepalivePeriod` | Zeitintervall für das Senden von Keep-Alive-Nachrichten. | `60` |
| `NewCircuitPeriod` | Zeitraum, nach dem Tor automatisch neue Circuits erstellt. | `10` |
| `DisableNetwork` | Schaltet die Netzwerkfunktion von Tor temporär aus. | `0` |
| `UseBridges` | Gibt an, ob Tor Bridges anstelle von normalen Entry-Nodes verwenden soll. | `1` |
| `MyFamily` | Liste von Fingerabdrücken anderer Relays, die vom selben Betreiber verwaltet werden. | `MyFamily $keyid1,$keyid2,...` |
Weitere Informationen stehen in der Konfigurationsdatei (auf Englisch)
## Tor Relay starten
Das Relay kann nach der Konfiguration mit `systemctl start tor.service` gestartet werden.
## Nyx in Verbindung mit Tor
Nyx, früher bekannt als Arm (Anonymizing Relay Monitor), ist eine Befehlszeilenanwendung für die Überwachung und Steuerung von Tor-Knoten. Sie bietet:
- Bietet detaillierte Echtzeit-Statistiken über den Betrieb eines Tor-Knotens.
- Einschließlich Bandbreitennutzung, Verbindungen, Logs und mehr.
- Ermöglicht das Überprüfen und Anpassen der Tor-Konfiguration direkt über die Anwendung.
- Zeigt eine Übersicht über den aktuellen Zustand des Tor-Netzwerks.
- Einsicht in Verbindungen, die durch den eigenen Knoten gehen.
- Anzeige von Tor-Logdateien in Echtzeit, nützlich für Fehlersuche und Monitoring.
- Trotz der Befehlszeilenbasis, bietet es eine benutzerfreundliche Schnittstelle.
- Ermöglicht auch weniger technisch versierten Benutzern effektive Überwachung und Verwaltung ihrer Tor-Instanzen.
Nyx ist ein essenzielles Werkzeug für jeden, der einen Tor-Knoten betreibt, insbesondere für diejenigen, die eine detaillierte Übersicht und Kontrolle über ihre Tor-Instanzen benötigen.
Nyx wir ganz einfach gestartet mit `nyx`
## UFW Firewall
UFW kann folgendermaßen konfiguriert werden:
`sudo ufw allow from any to any port 9001 proto tcp comment "ANY > TOR Onion Routing"`
`sudo ufw allow from any to any port 9030 proto tcp comment "ANY > TOR Directory Port"`
`ufw reload`
## Weiterführende Links
- https://nyx.torproject.org/#config_editor
- https://deb.torproject.org/
- https://community.torproject.org/de/onion-services/setup/install/#installing-tor-from-source
- https://support.torproject.org/de/relay-operators/
- https://support.torproject.org/de/apt/tor-deb-repo/

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#!/bin/bash
# Script Name: tor-relay-installer-ubuntu2204.v1.sh
# Beschreibung: Installiert ein Tor-Relay
# Aufruf: curl -s https://git.media-techport.de/scriptos/torproject/raw/branch/main/tor-relay-installer-ubuntu2204.v1.sh | bash
# Autor: Patrick Asmus
# Web: https://www.media-techport.de
# Git-Reposit.: https://git.media-techport.de/scriptos/torproject.git
# Version: 1.0
# Datum: 14.03.2024
# Modifikation: Initiale Freigabe
#####################################################
# Aktualisiere Paketlisten
sudo apt update
sudo apt install apt-transport-https -y
# Füge Tor Repository hinzu
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg] https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jammy main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/tor.list
echo "deb-src [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg] https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jammy main" | sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/tor.list
# Importiere und speichere den GPG-Schlüssel des Tor-Projekts
curl -s https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg >/dev/null
# Installation der Pakete
sudo apt update
sudo apt install deb.torproject.org-keyring tor nyx -y
cp /etc/tor/torrc /etc/tor/torrc.orig
echo ""
echo "----------------------------------------------------"
echo "Bitte stelle sicher, dass die Konfiguration in Ordnung ist, bevor du Tor mit <systemctl start tor.service> startest!"
echo " Die Konfiguration kannst du mit <nano /etc/tor/torrc> bearbeiten."
echo "----------------------------------------------------"

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## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
OutboundBindAddress 0.0.0.0
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
Nickname meinname
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
RelayBandwidthRate 3840 KBytes
RelayBandwidthBurst 5760 KBytes
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
DirPort 9030
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0

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## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0